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SUCCESS 
© 1998 Michael Goldsmith. and James Gibson .. 
J, INTRODUCTION 
Before federal sentencing refonn limited judicial discretion, defendants 
often trembled at the thought that "the law is what the judge had for breakfast." 
Certain culinary items suggested light sentences geared towards rehabilitation 
(eggs over easy, instant oatmeal, Sweet 'N Low, Lucky Channs, and Cheerios). 
Ho\vever, others evoked harsher irnages of retribution, deterrence, and 
incapacitation (hard boiled eggs, bacon extra crisp, and especially Total, Life, or 
any type of toast). Of course, if the judge had dined on waffles or Fruit Loops 
(as often seemed to be the case), all bets were off. 
Except for statutory caps, federal judges e1tjoyed wide latitude with 
virtually no appellate review. Under this open-ended system, trial judges could 
always finish the day content that justice had been served. Regardless of 
whether they had tempered justice with mercy or sent a tough,on-crime 
message, their judgment was always right-or at least not subject to meaningful 
appeal.' 
Congress, however, did not share this confidence. Judicial discretion 
had produced wide disparities in sentencing similarly situated offenders.' When 
1nore than 500 trial judges each applied his or her own sense of justice without 
any governing standard, unwarranted disparity inevitably occurred. For a nation 
grounded in equal justice, this situation proved intolerable. Congress responded 
by enacting the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1984.' 
The Act had two goals: (1) removing unwarranted disparities; and 
(2) producing "truth in sentencing" by eliminating parole,' which had allowed 
'B.S., 1972; J.D., 1975, Cornell University; Professor of Law, Brigham Young 
University; fonner Vice-Chair, United States Sentencing Commission. This 
article is an edited transcript of a speech given by Professor Goldsmith at the 
Fortunoff Colloquium on Criminal Justice at New York University School of 
Law. The views expressed herein are those of the Authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 
"B.A., 1991, Yale University; J.D., 1995, University of Virginia; Associate, 
Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C.; fonner Attorney-Adviser, United 
States Sentencing Conunission. 
many defendants to serve only one-third of their sentences.' Under the Act, 
Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission and directed it 
to produce a sentencing systetn in \Vhich each crhne carried a definite 
irnprisorunent range, subject to adjushnent for specific offense characteristics 
and the offendef's criminal history.6 
The resulting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' recenlly marked their tenth 
anniversary, but many observers of the federal criminal justice system found 
little to celebrate about the continued existence of this revolutionary system. 
That it is revolutionary is not in doubt. Even Second Circuit Judge Jose 
Cabranes-one of the guidelines' 1nost vocal critics-admits that the guidelines 
are one of this century's n1ost significant develop1nents in federal 
jurisprudence.' The guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act that created 
them did a\vay \Vith parole and rnoved to a ntodel of deten11inate sentencing 
under which judges must follow the guidelines' detailed sentencing calculus. 
What is in doubt is whether the guidelines represent an advance in our 
nation's approach to criminal Ja,v, or a step back\vard-a "disn1al failure," as 
Judge Cabranes so bluntly asserted a few years ago.' My goal is to convince 
you that lhe guidelines are in fact a surprising success, indeed that they represent 
a step fonvard in federal crhninal justice. 
This goal is no small task. Criticisms of the guidelines are not hard lo 
find. When the guidelines were first introduced in the late eighties, the chorus 
of hisses and boos from the federal bench was deafening. Academics and 
practitioners were not kindly disposed either. Of the more thau 600 articles 
written about the guidelines, only a handful have been favorable. Far more 
common are those \vhose titles contain terms such as Hfailure," "mess," 
"unacceptable," "death,1' "disease," and "fla\ved."10 Indeed, about the 111ost 
neutral description I could find appeared in a few articles that merely referred to 
the guidelines as "controversial."11 
Not to be discouraged, I conducted a Westla\v search for articles \Vhose 
titles combined the terms "guidelines" and "love." This, surprisingly enough, 
triggered one response: an article in the Wisconsin Law Review by former 
Commission staffer Frank Bo\vman, no\V a professor ofla\v. 12 
Encouraged by this response, I then searched Westlaw for articles 
combining the tem1s "guidelines" and "cheer." TI1is, too, produced a single 
response: "One Cheer for the Guidelines," by federal judge Stuart Dalzell. 13 (I 
was unable to find any articles entitled "A Second Cheer for the Guidelines" or 
"How I Learned to Stop Worrying About Those Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.") Given the dearth of favorable legal reviews, I am especially 
indebted to Professor Bowman and Judge Dalzell for helping me to defend a 
system that has been so widely attacked, and I rely heavily on their work for this 
presentation. 
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The guidelines' critics, however numerous, tend to identify only four 
overarching problems with the system. First, they say, the guidelines take the 
"human element" out of sentencing by prohibiting the use of certain factors that 
were key to judges' sentencing decisions in the pre-guidelines era. 14 Second, the 
factors that are not prohibited are assigned a pre-detem1ined weight, thus 
robbing judges of any meaningful discretion and transferring power to the 
prosecution." TI1ird, the sentences that result from application of the guidelines 
are too long. 16 And fourth, the guidelines are too con1plex. 17 
TI1ere is some merit to these criticisms. But none of them compels the 
conclusion that the guidelines system is a failure. Al worst, they identify areas 
in \Vhich the Sentencing Comn1ission and Congress can make ilnprovements. 
By reviewjng these criticis1ns one at a time, I hope to convince you that the 
current system is in fact working rather well, and that the future only looks 
brighter. 
IJ, PROHIBITED FACTORS 
First, the jjprohibited factors" argument. Critics of the guidelines 
farnent the absence of certain defendant characteristics from the guidelines' 
sentencing calculus: age, en1ploytnent status, \York history, education, farnily, 
community lies, et cetera." These were the very factors that judges used in the 
pre~guidelines era to uhumanizeu and individualize sentencing. For exan1ple, a 
judge might generally have had an idea of how a bank robber should be 
sentenced, but this general notion was fine-tuned by considering the personal 
factors that made the robber 'vho he or she 'vas. The guidelines, ho,vever, 
expressly categorize these san1e characteristics as 11not ordinarily relevant.n 19 
It's no wonder that the bench didn't like this new way of doing things. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for restricting the use of these 
characteristics. Chief among them is their unpredictable effect. Professor 
Bowman posits the following example:" suppose we have two defendants, both 
convicted of fraud. One is a twenty-one year-old Mexican inunigrant, raised by 
a grandparent after his drng-abusing mother abandoned him at age ten. A high 
school dropout with a history of gang involvement and a series of increasingly 
serious crimes on his juvenile record, he's before the court because he stole 
credit cards from the mail and ran up over $9,000,000 in unauthorized charges. 
The second defendant is a fifty-five year-old white male, married, with 
three children. He's a graduate of the NYU and has been a bank vice president 
for years, \vith a spotless employtnent record. A rnember of several civic and 
charitable associations, he coaches a youth soccer team -and is a long-time 
vestryman at the local Episcopalian church. He's in trouble with the law for the 
first time, for having embezzled $9,000,000 from his employer during the 
course of the last few years. 
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At sentencing, the Latino youth's lawyer would probably argue that the 
defendant's troubled upbringing, tender years, lack of guidance, and poor 
education mitigated the seriousness of his conduct. The prosecutor, ho\vevcr, 
would likely look at these same factors in light of the youth's prior record and 
argue that the defendant has not lean1ed his lesson frorn past incidents, and thus 
poses a serious threat ofrecidivism.21 
Meanwhile, in the courtroom next door, the attorney for the "pillar of 
the community" embezzler is pointing to a theretofore spotless life, adorned 
\Vith various fonns of service to the conmn1nity, a loving and dependent fa1nily, 
and an unblemished reputation-the sullying of which alone constitutes 
·adequate punislunent. The prosecutor also cites these factors, but asserts that 
this defendant is for those very same reasons especially unsympathetic. He had 
every advantage that society could bestow, and he threw it all away simply for 
greed." 
No\v, in the pre-guideJines era (Professor Bo,vman argues) the outcon1e 
of these hvo cases depended entirely on the l\vorld vie,v" of the sentencing 
judge." If the judge thought that the young credit card thief had just never 
gotten a fair shake from society and deserved another chance, he could receive 
nothing more than a stem \Yarning and routine visits \Vith a probation officer. If 
the judge thought that this kid was beyond redemption, and that society's best 
hope \Vas to keep hitn off the streets for as long as possible, then the statutory 
maximum sentence might be imposed. 
Likewise, if the judge sees the banker as a productive, worthy, and 
respected member of the comn1unity who \Vas guilty of no more than one 
aberrant error of judgment, probation could be the result. If the judge were 
instead to focus on greed, and betrayal of the system that had bestowed so much 
favor on the defendant, a long prison tenn rnight a\vait the embezzler.24 
A tough call in both cases, especially since neither of these outcomes is 
necessarily "right" or 11 \Vrong."25 Youth is usually an indicator for a high risk of 
recidivistn,26 but young defendants are also often seen as rnore deserving of a 
chance for rehabilitation. The white collar criminal may be deterred .by sheer 
embarrassrnent and other fonns of social disapprobation associated \Vith 
conviction, thus lessening the need for incarceration,27 but retributive principles 
argue for harsher treatinent of those \Vho had every advantage society had to 
offer but who nevertheless transgressed. In any event, the idea that anyone 
could consistently sort through these different goals and principles to produce 
the 11right1' sentence in each case is illusory. 
Furthermore, there is another danger in relying too closely on factors 
such as age, employment, education, and family history. As Judge Dalzell has 
observed, those characteristics can easily correlate \vith factors that everyone 
agrees should not be considered, such as race, sex, national origin, and maybe 
4 
even religion." One need only look at the recent controversy over the disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine sentences to realize that an ostensibly well-
intentioned and race-neutral sentencing policy can produce problematic 
results.29 
Given these difficulties, the most reasonable approach for these 
personal defendant characteristics is to de-emphasize them and to focus instead 
on more objective criteria: the criminal conduct itself and the defendant's 
history of criminal convictions. And that's exactly what the federal guidelines 
do. All the calculations under the guidelines culminate in a sentencing table, in 
which the Yaxis represents the seriousness of the defendant's offense and the X 
axis represents the defendant's criminal record.'° Cross-referencing these two 
factors produces a sentencing range, the top of \Vhich n1ay be no n1ore than 
twenty-five percent higher than the bottom." The jndge is then free to choose 
any sentence \vithin that range. 32 
This is an important point, because it shows that the guidelines do not 
completely bar consideration of these factors I have been discussing. The 
guidelines only say that these factors are not ordinarily relevant in determining 
which range applies to a given case. Once the range of potential prison terms 
has been detennined, judges are free to apply whatever factors they see fit in 
choosing the futal sentence. Professor Bowman calls it "a hierarchy of 
sentencing values--0ffense severity first, prior criminal history second, [and] 
personal characteristics third."33 To me, this ranking represents an itnprovement 
over what came before; it's a happy compromise between the fear of a 
"dehumanized" sentencing process on the one hand and the danger of 
unacceptable sentencing disparity on the other. 
III. JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Let rne now address the second major criticis1n of ihe guideline system, 
namely that judges have been robbed of all meaningful discretion, not just with 
regard to the "prohibited factors" I have been discussing, but with regard to the 
whole process, from begim1ing to end. 34 Picture if you will a pre-guidelines 
sentencing proceeding. S\vathed in emline-or polyester, as the case may be-
the judge looks down from the bench at the defendant and intones in an 
imposing, stentorian voice, "I have heard the evidence and have decided that 
you shall spend X years in the federal penitentiary." The X years, of course, was 
any prison tem1 that fell between the statutory maximum and minimum for the 
offense of conviction. The judge had that much discretion, and was subject to 
essentially no appellate review." 
Of course, the sentence imposed by the judge in the pre-guidelines era 
was rarely the sentence that the defendant was actually going to serve. It was 
the parole board that detennined the ultimate release date. The focus under this 
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model was on rehabilitation; the idea was that the judge and the parole board 
could accurately determine when a defendant had endured enough punishment 
to emerge reformed. Penitentiaries existed to make their imnates penitent. 
Corrections facilities theoretically prodliced "corrected" citizens.36 
This idea fell out of vogue, however, as people gradually lost faith in 
the notion that a judge and a parole board could figure it all out. Rehabilitation 
\Vas not an ignoble goal of punishment) but it \Vas difficult to achieve on such a 
grand scale. We had quality jurists on the federal bench, but to demand such a 
degree of foresight fron1 them \Vas unrealistic. So Congress sa\v the Sentencing 
Reform Act as a \Vay to n1ove to a more realistic systetn, one that \vould 
concentrate more on the other traditional goals of sentencing: retribution) 
deterrence1 and incapacitation.37 
Consequently, under the sentencing guidelines, the parole board is out 
of the picture entirely, and the judge has absolute control only over where to 
sentence the defendant within the twenty-five percent parameters of the 
applicable guideline range. Judicial discretion is clearly not what it used to be. 
The question is whether this is a bad thing. 
Many judges think so. This should not come as a surprise.38 The 
Sentencing Reform Act divested the bench of a power that not only was 
essentially unchecked, but that had also been an exclusively judicial function for 
hundreds of years. Judges were used to making sentencing decisions, and they 
not unreasonably thought that they had a handle on this aspect of their jobs. It 
might be hard to find a judge from the pre-guidelines era who didn't think that 
he or she had the wisdom to decide what punishment a given defendant 
deserved. 
And maybe-if you take a charitable view of the federal bench-you 
might believe that each and every pre-guidelines judge had a coherent, rational, 
intemally consistent sentencing philosophy, so that a defendant who appeared 
before the judge one \Veek could be reasonably assured of being sentenced 
under the same criteria as the defendant \Vho had been there the \Veek before. 
Maybe sentencing wasn't about what the judge had had for breakfast. So one 
can readily understand why judges might resent being stripped of this authority. 
But the concern behind the Sentencing Refonn Act was not that an 
individual judge needed sentencing guidelines to keep hin1 or her from 
sentencing two similar defendants in vastly different ways. The problem was 
that a judge would sentence differently from the judge next door." In one 
infamous study'° that sparked the sentencing reform movement, fifty district 
judges from the Second Circuit \Vere given presentence reports frotn t\venty 
actual cases, involving a representative range of offenses, and \Vere asked \Vhat 
sentence they \Vould in1Pose in each. The results \Vere ren1arkable and 
disturbing. Now, one might expect that the most severe sentence would differ 
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greatly fron1 the least severe sentence, and that in fact occurred. 41 But even 
toward the middle of the pack, the disparities were ovenvhelming: for many 
cases, the hvelfth ntost severe sentence produced a prison tenn that \Vas hvo or 
even three times the length of the twelfih least severe sentence.42 In only four of 
the twenty cases did the judges agree on whether the defendant should serve any 
tin1e.0 With no hint of overstatement, the report concluded that "absence of 
consensus is the nom1."44 
Of course, no study can conclusively prove that such monstrous. 
disparities are conunonplace. But Professor Bowman's examples of the Latino 
credit card crook and the embezzling Anglo-Saxon banker illustrate how federal 
judges can reasonably disagree significantly about \vhat a given defendant's 
punislunent should be. And these examples, incidentally, only focused on the 
defendants' backgrounds; they didn't even touch on the notion that different 
judges would likely have different opinions regarding how much punishment 
the criminal conduct itself merited. To use another example, one judge might 
think that tnarijuana possession is no n1ore than a self.destructive vice deserving 
of little govenllliental sanction. But the judge in the next courtroon1 might see 
any involvement \Vith narcotics as a significant, blante\vorthy Jink. in the chain 
of illegal drng networks that are a scourge of modem society. And although 
neilher of these vie\vs is unconunon or unreasonable, they \VOuld probJtbly lead 
to vastly different sentencing outco1nes. 
Quite clearly, it perverts justice to have two defendants who committed 
the same crime and who share the same background sentenced under different 
criteria, with correspondiugly different results, merely because they end up 
before different judges. Reducing this kind of disparity was, of course, one of 
the central tenets of the sentencing reform effort that culminated in the 
enactment of the guidelines. If you don't agree that this inter-judge disparity is 
cause for concern, then there's no hope of converting you to 1ny cause, and you 
should feel free to get up and head to the bar. 
Excellent. A room full of potential converts. Every law professor's 
dream. Still, the mere fact that sentencing disparity is a legitimate concern does 
not tell us what we should do about it. It certainly doesn't mean that judges 
should have no say in a defendant's sentence; even the most fanatic convert to 
the disparity-avoidance theory must realize that judges have an important role to 
play in the punislunent process. 
So let me suggest that the sentencing guidelines offer a happy medium: 
the guidelines prescribe a range of punishment, and the judge can choose any 
sentence in that range. As I said before, this means that the judge basically 
determines the last twenty-five percent of the sentence. To those who complain 
about this lin1itation on judicial discretion, I paraphrase Professor Bo\vman and 
ask why a judge's personal, unreviewable, unpredictable, and essentially secret 
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views should ever control more than twenty-five percent of a defendant's fate." 
Moreover, in many instances the court still retains control over 
important aspects of the defendant's sentence. The court has considerable 
discretion in setting the appropriate fine. 46 In the lo\ver ranges of the sentencing 
table, the court tnay decide \Vhether to forego imprisorunent in favor of 
probation, hotne detention, conununity confinernent, or sorne cotnbination 
thereof. 47 Setting the tenns and conditions of probation and supervised release 
is still very much in the bailiwick of the sentencing judge.48 
And, of course, the guidelines provide an escape hatch for the judge 
who has good reason to believe that the prescribed sentencing range has failed 
to account for the unique aspects of a particular case. If there is son1e 
"aggravating or mitigating circurnstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration" by the guidelines, the judge may 11depart,11 that is to 
say, choose a more appropriate sentencing range.49 Although such a decision is 
subject to revie\v, the Supreme Court's 1996 Koon decision50 affim1ed the 
sentencing judge's unique position to rnake such a determination: nA district 
court's decision to depart from the Guidelines ... \Viii in most cases be due 
substantial deference, for it e1nbodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a 
sentencing court."51 
"Fine," you rnay say. "Let's pretend you've convinced 1ne that the 
1in1itations on judicial discretion aren't con1pletely ill~founded. But the 
Sentencing Refonn Act didn't just take discretion away from judges and give it 
to the Sentencing Commission; it gave it to prosecutors." This is a conunon 
criticism of the guidelines," and it is not without some justification. Under the 
guidelines, prosecutors do have more influence over sentencing-relative to 
judges at least. But on close examination, it appears that the prosecutor really 
only has significant control over three aspects of the sentencing process. Let's 
examine them in tum. 
First, the prosecutor can decide not to bring certain charges, or to 
dismiss charges that have already been brought. TI1is point is not really a 
criticism of the guideline system, ho\vever, because the prosecutors have ahvays 
had this power (and have always used it to control the plea-bargaining and 
sentencing process). 53 Furthennore, the guidelines anticipate charge-based 
disparities and have a built-in response to this problem. That built-in defense is 
called "modified real-offense sentencing," which essentially means that the 
guidelines look beyond the count of conviction to what the defendant act11ally 
did." So if a prosecutor pleads a drng dealer down to a "sale of paraphernalia" 
charge, the guidelines will still treat that defendant as a dmg dealer-subject of 
course to the statutory maxinrnm sentence for the paraphemalia charge and 
contingent on proof at the sentencing hearing that the defendant was actually 
dealing dmgs." Accordingly, the prosecutor's ability to influence sentencing by 
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manipulating charges can hardly be said to have increased under the guidelines; 
the opposite may in fact be true, since the guidelines for the first time require 
the court to consider what the defendant actually did even, in dismissed or 
uncharged conduct. 
The second \Vay in \vhich the prosecutor influences sentencing is in his 
or her role as \Vhat Professor Bo,vman calls "master of the facts. "56 What this 
means is that the prosecutor, by choosing not to reveal certain evidence to the 
court, can influence the factual findings that go into 1naking sentencing 
detenninations. Now, historically the prosecutor has always had a lot of control 
over \vhat facts \Vere presented to the court1 but this control takes on increased 
itnportance under the guidelines, 'vhcre the relationship behveen the facts of a 
case and the sentencing outconte is more direct and predictable than it \vas in the 
pre-guidelines era. But there are significant limitations on this power as well, 
First, the judge is no naive outsider. Having sat through the 
defendant's trial, the court already knows a lot about the facts of the case. And 
at sentencing the judge is the one \Vho decides \Vhat evidence is credible and 
\Vhat evidence isn'f.57 Second, there's the probation officer \Vho prepares the 
presentence report. 111is is done in cooperation \Vith the prosecution, but 
probation officers can and do provide an important perspective that helps judges 
decide whether they've got the full picture.'' Third, the defendant and his or her 
attorney are not going to sit idly by and let the prosecutor run the show; we can 
count on then1 to present evidence of any mitigating circumstances. FinalJy, as 
an attomey and representative of the people the prosecutor is subject to 
considerable ethical constraints \Vhen it cornes to concealing relevant evidence.59 
So when all is said and done, the prosecutor's control of the facts falls 
well short of being a reliable way of circumventing the correct outcome under 
the guidelines. There is one area, however, in \Vhich the prosecutor's po\ver 
may have too few limits, and that is in seeking departures for "substantial 
assistance." Under the guidelines, if a defendant aids authorities in the 
investigation or prosecution of another offense, he or she rnay be entitled to a 
lower sentence-but only if the prosecution makes a motion to that effect.60 The 
defense 1nay not request such a departure, nor can the court grant one sua 
sponte.61 
The govenunent, of course1 is in the best position to detennine \vhether 
the defendant has really cooperated, but the statistics on the use of this 
prerogative cast doubt on whether it is really doing what it's supposed to do. In 
the late 1980s, substantial assistance departures were used in less than eight 
percent of all cases. 62 That number has steadily gro\vn; last year ahuost one in 
five defendants received a departure for substantial assistance." Obviously, this 
progression is not due lo some gradual realization by prosecutors that 
defendants might know something about other crimes. Rather, prosecutors 
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appreciate that their power to move for a substantial assistance departure is a 
useful bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process. And courts have 
acquiesced in this scheme by granting the motions-especially since judges 
often have even less desire than the prosecution to see these cases go to trial. In 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in recent years, almost fifty percent of 
defendants have received this bonus." Perhaps Philadelphia is a city of 
exceptionally \Vell infonned rats, but at the very least its substantial assistance 
rate gives ne\v n1eaning to the tenn 11brotherly love." 
I would guess that relatively few of these cases involve much in the 
\Vay of useful infon11ation fron1 the defendant; the prosecution is just cutting the 
defense a sweet deal to get a conviction without going before a jury. And the 
deal can indeed be sweet. Some of you may have heard of the case of Alan 
Eagleson, an National Hockey League Hall of Farner who recently pleaded 
guilty to three counts of mail fraud related to his shady dealings as a sports 
agent and union head." He had been accused of stealing millions and was 
indicted on thirty-six counts of Jabor fraud, racketeering, en1bezzlement1 
obstn1ction of justice, and so on.66 His three counts of conviction \vould have 
resulted in a guideline sentence of approximately four years,67 but the 
prosecution gave him a substantial assistance departure and he got only 
probation." 
No\v Mr. Eagleson 1s case n1ay have been special-it involved 
Canadian charges as \veH69-and he n1ay \Veil have helped the prosecution a 
great deal. I use this example merely to point out how great these sentence 
reductions can be, and therefore ho'v te1npting it is for prosecutors to use them 
when they want a concession from the defense. This is sotnetitnes a regrettable 
aspect of the sentencing guidelines system, and I believe it is the source of many 
of the criticisms directed at prosecutorial power under the Sentencing Reform 
Act. But I do find it interesting that the prosecution's ability to seek substantial 
assistance departures, like its ability to conceal aggravating facts fron1 the court, 
has only a lowering effect on sentences.70 
So all this hubbub about increased prosecutorial power is really about 
power that is only useful to lower sentences from what they would otherwise be. 
If the Cotn1nission could figure out a \Vay to limit this prosecutorial discretion1 
then, the result would probably be higher sentences. Is this what the critics of 
the guidelines want? I am sure it's not.11 In fact, the third major criticism of the 
guidelines, to which I will now tum, is that they produce overly severe 
sentences. If this is true, then 1naybe n1y cynicism regarding the sentence~ 
lowering machinations in which prosecutors engage is misplaced. Maybe 
they're not simply trying to avoid a trial; maybe they're trying to reach a inore 
equitable result. And maybe the complaints about loss of judicial discretion 
would not be so shrill if the sentences that the guidelines produced were not as 
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high. 
IV, SENTENCE LENGTH 
So are sentences too long under the guidelines? Yes and no. Or maybe 
I should put it this way: no, except in one area-drugs. Many drug sentences 
are admittedly too high, but these sentences usually reflect what Congress has 
done independently of the Connnission. I refer, of course, to the mandatory 
minimurn penalties for dn1g trafficking. 
Mandatory minimum penalties represent exactly \Vhat the guidelines 
are 110/ all about. They focus on just one isolated aspect of the defendant's 
conduct, to the exclusion of all other considerations. In the dmg statutes, that 
one factor is the quantity of dmgs involved in the offense.12 A guidelines 
system, on the other hand, is designed to weigh the good against the bad, and 
not let any one aspect of the case ovenvhelm all other relevant sentencing 
considerations. 
And to the Commission's credit, it has consistently opposed the use of 
mandatory minimums in general and unduly harsh dmg statutes in particular. In 
1991 the Commission submitted a report to Congress that roundly criticized the 
concept ofn1andatory minin1un1s. 73 And in 1995 the Conunission unanimously 
crilicized the infa1nous 100:1 crack·to·pO\vder quantity ratio under which 
dealing ten grams of crack cocaine is punished the same as dealing a kilo of 
po\vder cocaine. 74 Unfortunately) Congress didn't take the Conunission up on 
either initiative.7.s 
Indeed, if we didn't have the guidelines, judges would probably be 
dealing with more of these mandatory minimum statutes; if Congress is willing 
to enact such provisions in the face of the federal guideline system we already 
have in place, imagine what Congress might do absent such a system. The 
tetnptation to fill that vacuum \Vith even more statutory sentencing 
enhancements would probably be overwhelming. Opponents of the guidelines 
should be careful of what they ask for-they might get it. And a whole lot 
tnore.76 
As for non-drug sentences, there are good reasons for their severity. 
The original Commissioners drafted the guidelines in the late 1980s with a 
certain vie\V a~ to the role of'fcdcral la\v enforcement. We've aii heard the 
pluase, 11Don 1 t 1nake a federal case out of.it."77 It irnplies, of course, that federal 
jurisdiction over criminal inatters should be reserved for critnes more serious 
than your mn-of-the-mill case. So if a bank fraud is serious enough to warrant 
attention from the feds, then it probably deserves more punishment than the guy 
011 the corner who tries to sell you a fake Rolex watch (spelled with two "L"s). 
Federal sentences should be tough because the feds aren't-or at least shouldn't 
be-wasting their time with small fry. 78 
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Further, once we set aside the Congressionally mandated drng 
sentences ( drngs, by the way, account for about forty percent of all federal 
cases"), the guidelines' punishment levels just aren't that high. In fact, drngs 
aside, the Commission most often hears complaints from the public about 
sentences being too low. This is especially trne for white collar offenses and 
critnes of violence. In my vie\v, then, the source of the general discontent about 
sentence length is the same as the source of the discontent about limited judicial 
discretion: some drug sentences are too high, This is unfortunately sometin1es 
trne, but it has little to do with the Sentencing Reform Act, the Sentencing 
Guidelines, or the Sentencing Conunission. 
V, COMPLEXITY 
Now to the last major criticism of the guidelines: they're too hard to 
understand.80 Before I get into this one, I \Yant to reinforce one basic 
understanding. We're talking about a system of guidelines that replaced a 
vac11u111. That is to say, there \Vas nothing governing sentencing decisions in the 
pre-guidelines era except for the general, toothless limitation that the sentence 
could not be illegal, which basically meant that the judge had to choose a 
sentence \Vithin the statutory 1ninin1um and rnaximurn, 81 . 
So the movement to a sentencing guidelines system \Vas clearly going 
to result in relatively increased complexity. This may seem obvious, but a 1996 
Washington Post series critical of the guidelines began by asserting that "[a] 
system incant to simplify the punislunents nleted out for particular crin1es has 
tnade then1 more con1plicated .... "82 It continued, "A systen1 nleant to 
streamline the sentencing process instead has clogged the courts \vith appeals 
••• ,"
83 No\v, I don't kno\V \vhere the Post \Vas getting its infonnation, but 
anyone who thinks that going from a system of unlimited discretion and no 
accountability to a strnctured, uniform framework of universally applicable 
legal mies will simplify or streamline anything is just not the swiftest pony in 
the corral. I mean, you can't gel any simpler or more streamlined than the pre-
guidelines system. Tiiat was the whole problem. 
So the question is-assuming for the moment that the idea of a 
sentencing guidelines sys tern is an acceptable one-is \Vhat , \Ve have too 
complicated? Well, what do we have? We have a book, a guidelines manual. 
Nice friendly fonnat, big fonts. Lots of \Vhite space. Look here, these t\vo 
pages are almost completely devoid of text!" And this one is completely 
blank!" Try finding that in a bankmptcy manual or the internal revenue code. 
Any\vay, the substantive portion of the manual is about four hundred 
pages long. (The rest is composed of appendices and other reference material 
that make the substantive portion easier to understand, rather than more 
complicated.) Frankly, that ain't bad, considering that we have over nine 
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hundred different federal offenses to cover.86 The federal criminal code, \vhich 
to an extent dictates the degree of complexity of the guidelines, is hardly a 
model of clarity. And, of course, only a small fraction of the manual's pages are 
consulted in a given case. If you don't violate the tenns of your probation or 
supervised release, you're never going to see Chapter Seven. If you're not an 
organization, Chapter Eight is out. I'm an1azed at ho\v slim this thing is, con1e 
to think of it. 
I'm kidding, of course, but so many critics of the guidelines point to 
the length of the manual and then instantly conclude, without any further 
evidence, that the system is just way too complicated. As anyone who has 
practiced under the guidelines will acknowledge, however, it's nothing like 
ERISA or any of the other more arcane areas of the law. It's just not that hard. 
The complaints from practitioners about the complexity of the guidelines are 
really just the griping of those who preferred the old system, where sentencing 
was a crap-shoot and there were no standards to speak of.87 
And I should point out that the Commission has an extensive training 
staff that flies all over the country helping judges, probation officers, and 
attorneys learn how to deal with the guidelines. The same staff also maintains a 
help line that anyone can call \Vith questions about guideline application. And, 
frotn 'vhat I understand, the Conunission staff has a much better record than 
those folks \vho ans\ver questions over at the IRS. 
We must also recognize that the Sentencing Refom1 Act de1nands a 
certain level of complexity from the guidelines. As I mentioned before, all the 
guideline calcnlations eventually lead you to the sentencing table, on which the 
Y axis represents the seriousness of the defendant's offense and the X axis 
represents the defendant's criminal record." The 'y axis has forty-three 
different levels, and the X axis has six." That's two hundred and fifty-eight 
different cells containing sentencing ranges. It certainly looks pretty complex, 
especially if you've seen some state sentencing guideline tables, (Mirmesota's 
table, for instance, only has seventy cells.'') 
But the Sentencing Reform Act put two restrictions on the Commission 
that made a table of this complexity pretty much unavoidable, First, as I 
mentioned before, the top of each sentencing range can be no more than twenty-
five percent greater than the bottom." So if the bottom of a range is, say, forty 
months, the top of the range can't be more than fifty months, A range that starts 
at one hundred months can't end higher than one hundred twenty-five months. 
You get the idea. (See? This stuff isn't that tough,) 
Second, the Sentencing Refonn Act required that the table top out at 
about thirty years, because that was the point at which the Act allowed the 
Comn1ission to authorize a life sentence.92 So it \Vas the combination of these 
two factors (plus some minor, reasonable policy decisions by the original 
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Conunission") that led lo such a detailed table: the Conunission had to use 
fairly small ranges, and it had·to use them all the way up to the thirty-year mark. 
That meant a lot of cells. And, of course, once the Conunission had all 
those cells, it had to come up with some way to distinguish them from one 
another. You can't have hvo hundred and fifty-eight cells and just one or hvo 
factors to consider per case. 
All this technical stuff aside, there's one aspect of the complexity 
criticism that I have yet to address, and it's the rnost \Vorrisome aspect. La,vyers 
may be able to understand the guidelines without too much trouble, but can 
defendants understand what's happening to them? Calculating which of the two 
hundred and fifty-eight cells a defendant falls into involves some number-
crunching, and there is a danger that defendants could get overwhelmed by all 
the math and lose the sense that there's any underlying justice in the process." 
On the other hand, I do think that in most cases a defense attorney cau 
usually sit down with his or her client and explain the process in plain English in 
half an hour or less. The typical presentence report section that contains the 
sentencing calculations is usually just a fe\v pages, and it's not that hard to 
understand. "Well, Jack, take a look at this guideline: You robbed a bank, so 
you start with twenty-two points." You had a gun on you, so that's another 
five. 96 You look off with $100,000 and a bank guard in tow; that's another six." 
But you've accepted responsibility for what you did, and you cooperated 
some\vhat \Vith authorities after you were caught, so that's three points off. 98 
That gives you a total Offense Level of 30. Your two prior thefts and one 
assault put you in Criminal History category Ill.99 So, on this table you can see 
that an Offense Level of30 and Criminal History category Ill mean that you'll 
get between 121and151 months."100 
No,v, that's not that bad, is it? You may think it sounds too clinical, 
but it's certainly not nearly as inscrutable as critics make it out to be. Of course, 
I'd like to do even better than that; I would like to see the guidelines simplified 
to a point at which defendants could understand them just by picking up the 
manual and paging through it. '°1 In fact, I've been a major proponent of the 
Commission's simplification project. 
Bui there's no easy way to get from here to there, and so I console 
myself once again by comparing the present state of things with what came 
before. In the pre-guidelines era, a bank robbery defendant, who used a gun, 
wotild appear for sentencing knowing only that he or she could gel anywhere 
front probation to 25 years. 102 At best, the court \vould recite a litany of criteria 
that it had considered in setting the punishment and would then announce the 
result, the final sentence. The defendant might even think that this wasn't a bad 
method, that the judge had mentioned some reasonable stuff-until the 
defendant n1et a fellow inmate \Vho had conunitted exactly the sarne critne and 
14 
was only serving half the time. 
At worst, a pre-guidelines sentencing would not even seem to follow 
any logical sentencing calculus. As Professor Bo\vman says, 11If there is one 
spectacle Jess illuminating [to a defendant] than the intricacies of a guidelines 
argument, it is that of a judge in an indeterminate sentencing system sitting in 
sphinx-like silence through a sentencing and then proclain1ing, 'In consideration 
of all the factors presented before me today, I sentence you to [25 years]. Thank 
you. We \Viii be in recess. "'103 In such a case, the defendant might not \Yonder 
what all the math was about, but would nevertheless probably lose faith in the 
system right there in the courtroom. 
So when I lament the complexity and potential for confusion that 
sometimes mar the guidelines system, I stop and think about what result I would 
prefer: a defendant bowled over by numbers, who needs a lawyer to explain 
\Vhat it's all about, or a defendant \Vho, upon hearing the sentence, turns to his 
lawyer and asks why he got so much time, only to be met with a blank stare, a 
shrng, and a "I dunno. Judge musta had indigestion this morning." I'll take the 
math anytime. 
And finally, even if the defendant's eyes glaze over throughout the 
whole process, and he or she never really understands what happened, I am 
son1e,vhat comforted by the idea that at least there lvas a process at 1vork. 104 
When the state deprives someone of liberty, the need for a regimented, 
procedurally sound, reviewable process is at its highest. 105 Maybe there were 
tin1es \Vhen pre-guideline sentencing see111ed more comprehensible to 
defendants, but hidden behind the judge's explanation was at best a rationale 
that could be totally different from that of the judge next door, and at worst 
subconscious, insidious inconsistencies and biases. 
VI. VISIBILITY 
This brings me to my final point. It's not a response to any of the four 
criticis1ns I have been discussing. Rather, it's a unique and important advantage 
of the guidelines system, one that I think would convince even the guidelines' 
most rabid critic that at least ~omething good has come of the Sentencing 
Reform Act. And that is that the system is visible. The pre-guidelines 
sentencing system-to the extent that there was anything that could properly be 
called a system-was entirely invisible. No one knew what was going into a 
given sentencing decision. 
But no\v \Ve have a wealth of information about sentencing practices, 
and \VC have opened vast ne\v areas of criminal justice to empirical analysis. In 
a big roorn at lhe Senlencing Cornmission, lhere are dozens of dala extractors 
who do nothing all day except sit there and code every case that is decided 
under the guidelines. That means that for each of the almost 50,000 sentencings 
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that occur in the federal courts each year, 106 the Conunission collects a pool of 
variables !hat explain ho\v the sentence came to be, This database is publicly 
available to anyone \Vho wants to use it, aQ.d many people do. 107 
So it's no \vonder that there are so many criticis1ns of the guidelines: 
there's so tnuch to see. And \Vhenever a valid criticism is 1nade, I find 
consolation by thinking, "Hey, at leas! we can see the problem. We don'! have 
to speculate." 
And, of course, once we have identified a problem, a corollary 
advantage of the system comes 10 light: we can fix ii in the traditional, public, 
den1ocratic fashion. The process is no\V quasi-legislative. For instance, the 
crack/po\vder sentencing probletn is something that everyone can see, thanks to 
!he now-visible nature of sentencing and lo the data collection efforts of !he 
Conunission. And once a problem like that has been docurnented, solving it 
becomes a matter of the political process and political will.1°' Now, I'd be !he 
first lo admit Iha! the polilical process may not be !he mos! rational system in 
!he world. But compare it to the stale of things in !he pre-guidelines era, where 
racial disparity in a. single judge's sentencing practices-or in the syste1n 
overall-\vas very difficult to track in any co1nprehensive, rneaningful \Vay and 
would have been impossible lo correct 
VII, CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, despite the danger that our mathematically challenged 
legal profession might screw up !he numbers, I'm glad Iha! we have federal 
sentencing guidelines. They appropriately cabin judicial discretion without 
destroying ii. They trade simplicity for consistency, and come out ahead. And 
!he problems !hat do exist, such as some overly harsh drug sentences, can be 
identified and re1nedied much 1nore readily than was the case in the pre-
guidelines era. 
I am no! alone in my affection. Allhough the guideline system could 
hardly have been called popular when ii was first instituted, things have changed 
some\vhat over the ten years that it's been in place. Back then, over hvo 
hundred district judges invalidated the guidelines and all or part of !he 
Sentencing Reform Act109-unlil the Supreme Court upheld !he whole kil and 
caboodle.in the 1989 Mistretta case. 110 Bui more and more we see judges and 
practitioners whose only sentencing experiences have been under the guidelines, 
and who are more accepting of the system. 
In fact, the Federal Judicial Center recenlly surveyed all federal district 
judges'" and asked them, among other things, what they !hough! about the 
fain1ess of the major guidelines· areas, Jike dn1gs, fraud, inunigration, et cetera. 
The responses were done on a scale of one to five, \vhere one was too lenient, 
five was loo harsh, and three was just right, All twelve areas surveyed clustered 
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around the "just right" mark with the average score for all the areas combined 
being 3.03. 112 So judges may have problems with the guidelines system, but its 
overall fairness is apparently not among them. 
Finally, I think the guidelines embody an important concept, one 
mentioned in Judge Dalzell's article: that ours is "a government of laws, not 
men."113 There is no rnore momentous an interaction of the state and the 
individual than when the matter of that individual's liberty is being decided. At 
that point, then, it is not only appropriate but essential that the standards at play 
are consistent, just} and amenable to the democratic process. Ho\vever 
imperfectly, the sentencing guidelines look to that ideal, and they do so more 
faithfully than the system that came before. 
For these reasons, Judge Dalzell has wisely concluded that Churchill's 
adage about democracy probably applies with equal vigor to the federal 
guideline system: It is the worst possible way to sentence a defendant, except 
for all the others. 114 
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sentencing is based largely on an outmoded rehabilitation model. ... [I]t is now 
quite certain that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is 
rehabilitated."), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221; id. at 40 ("Recent 
studies suggest that [rehabilitation] has failed, and most sentencing judges as 
well as the Parole Commission agree that the rehabilitation model is not an 
appropriate basis for sentencing decisions. We know too little about human 
behavior lo be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or even to 
detennine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been 
rehabilitated.") (fooh1otes omitted), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223; 
Sentencing Refonn Act,§ 212(a)(2), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 1998 
( 11TI1e court, in detem1ining \Vhether to in1pose a tenn of imprisonment1 and, if a 
tenn of imprisonment is lo be imposed, in determining the length of the lenn, 
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shall ... recog1iiz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation.") (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)); id. 
§ 217(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 2022 ("The Commission shall insure 
that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a tem1 
ofimprisotunent for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant .... ") (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)); id.§ 217(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 2023 
("Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary 
and compelling reason [for sentence reduction].") (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(s)). 
"See Bowman, supra note 8, at 725 (noting that limitation of judicial discretion 
was the Sentencing Reform Act's principal purpose). 
"See id. at 686-87. 
'°PARTRIDGE & ELDRIDGE, supra note 2. 
41Id. tab. I. 
42/d. at 9 & tab. I. 
"Id. at 10. 
"Id. 
45Professor Bo\vn1an puts it this way: "The question Judge Cabranes and other 
guideline critics must answer is why the idiosyncratic judgments of a randomly 
selected judicial officer should ever control more than 25% of the sentence of 
any criminal defendant." Bo\Vman, supra note 8, at 713. 
"See U.S.S.G. § 5Bl.2. 
41See id.§§ 5Bl.1-.2, 5Cl.1, 5Fl.l-.3. 
48See id.§§ 5Bl.3, 5Dl.1-.3, 5Fl.5. 
"See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. 
"Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
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"Id. at 98; see also Bowman, supra note 8, at 718 (discussing departure 
authority as mitigating guidelines' limitation on judicial discretion). 
"See, e.g., David Boemer, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 
78 JUDICATURE 196 (1995); Freed, supra note 10, at 1723-24; Heaney, supra 
note 15, at 190-200. But see James B. Bums et al., We Make the Beller Target 
(But the Guidelines Shifted Powerfi'om the Judicimy to Congress, Not fi'om the 
Judicimy to the Prosecuti011), 91 Nw. L. REv. 1317 (1997). 
"See Stuart Nagel & Kathleen Levy, The Average May Be the Optimum ill 
Determi11ate Se11te11cing, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 622-23 (l 981) (discussing 
prosecution's pre-guidelines power in plea-bargaining and sentencing process); 
Louis B. Schwartz, Optio11s in Constructing A Sentencing System: Sentencing 
Guidelines Under Legislative or Judicial Hegemony, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 684-
686 (1981) (same); Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning up the Chicken Coop of 
Se111e11cing Uniformity: Guiding The Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through 
The Use of The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L, REV. 
1267, 1271 (1997) (same). 
"See U.S.S.G. ch l, pt. A, at 5-6 (explaining how the Commission came to 
adopt this approach). The guidelines themselves no longer use the words 
"modified real-offense"; the term was deleted in 1990. See U.S,S.G. app. C, at 
122, 126 (amendment 307). The term has nevertheless endured as a catchphrase 
for the guidelines' "relevant conduct" principle, embodied in U.S.S.G. § IBI.3. 
See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, !11 Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' 
Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U, L. REV. 1342 ( 1997). For an 
explanation of this principle by Conu11ission insiders, see Williarn W. Wilkins, 
Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Comers tone of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 497-503 (1990). Cf Bowman, 
supra note 8, at 703 ("[T]he essence of the [relevant conduct] concept is that the 
court can, indeed must, sentence each defendant based on what he really did as 
part of the same transaction or series of related transactions that resulted in the 
count of conviction, regardless of the specific offense of which a defendant is 
convicted after trial or as a result of a plea"). 
"Our hypothetical dmg dealer who pleads to a sale of paraphernalia charge 
under 21 U.S.C. § 863 would be sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.7. If the dmg 
dealing fell within his or her "relevant conduct," as defined by § 1B l.3, then the 
cross-reference in§ 2Dl.7(b)(I) would apply and the defendant would be 
sentenced under§ 2Dl.l, just like any other drng dealer. 
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j 6Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 726. 
"See id. at 718. 
"Professor Bowman characterizes the involvement of the probation officer as 
"possibly the greatest institutional constraint on unbridled manipulation of the 
facts by the parties [at sentencing]." Id. at 730. 
"See. e.g., U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL§ 9-27.400, .430, 
.710; Bo\vrnan, supra note 8, at 727-28. 
"'See U.S.S.G. §SKI.I. 
"See Wade v. United Stales, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (holding that court 
may revie\v prosecutor's decision not to move for substantial assistance 
departure only if based on unconstitutional motive or not rationally related lo 
any legitimate Govemment end). 
"For example, in 1989 the substantial assistance departure rate was 7.5%. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1990 lab. C-5 (1990). 
"The substantial assistance departure rate in fiscal year 1997 was 19.2%. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS 51 (1997). 
"In fiscal year 1996, 47.5% of all defendants in the Eastem District received a 
substantial assistance departure. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1996 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B ( 1996). The next 
year, the figure dropped to 41.8%. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 
63, app. B. 
"See Ex-NHL Union Head Enters Guilty Plea in Mail-Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., 
January 7, 1998, at B16. 
66See The Fall of R. Alan Eagleson, GLOBE & MAIL{Toronto), January 7, 1998, 
at S3. 
"The U.S. Attomey in the case thought that Eagleson could get anywhere from 
tluee lo ten years. See Sean Fine et al., The Bargain, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), 
January 7, 1998, at Al. Tiie judge calculated a guideline range of forty-one to 
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fifty-one months. See Ex-U11io11 Chief Eagleson Guilty of Mail Fraud, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS, January 7, 1998, at 9C. 
"See Ex-NHL U11io11 Head, s11pra note 65, at Bl6. 
"Eagleson's plea agreement involved extradition from Canada and resolution of 
criminal charges there as well. See Fine et al., s11pra note 67, at A I. 
Nevertheless, in the end he ended up serving only six months in Canadian 
prison. See Eagleson Leaves Jail, Can't Avoid Spotlight, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Toronto), July 8, 1998, at A3. 
70See Bo\'ttnan, supra note 8, at 726. 
71 Professor Bo\Vtnan \Vanis guidelines critics to "be careful what you \Vish for 
because you might get it." Id. at 732. 
12See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l). 
"U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDA TORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRJMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 33-34 ( 1991 ). 
"U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 195-200. 
"See Act of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (!09 Stat.) 
334 (disapproving ofConunission effort to eliminate crack/powder disparity). 
"See s11pra note 71. 
71Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 739. 
"See id. at 739. 
"U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 63, fig. A, at l l. 
so see sources cited supra note 17. 
81The only valid challenges to a sentence within the statutory range were based 
on a deficiency in the sentencing process. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443 (1972) (holding that sentencing judge's ignorance of 
unconstitutionality oft\vo prQvious convictions warranted reconsideration of 
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sentence). 
"Mary Pat Flaherty and Joan Biskupic, Despite Overhaul, Federal Sentencing 
Still Misfires, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at A 1. 
"Id. 
"U.S.S.G. at 38-39. 
"Id. at 258. 
"The statutory index to the guidelines lists well over 900 separate offenses. See 
id. app. A. Tiiere are countless others that are not listed; the federal code 
contains some 3,600 provisions that carry criminal sanctions. See Robert H. 
Joos!, Federal Criminal Code Reform: ls ft Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. LAW REV. 
195, 198 (1997). Note, however, that infractions and Class Band C 
misdemeanors do not fall within the sentencing guidelines' coverage. See 
U.S.S,G. § lBl.9. 
87Professor Bo,vn1an calls it "pro fonna bellyaching." Bo\'tn1an, supra note 8, at 
705. 
"See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). 
"Id. 
'°MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 45 ( 1998). 
"See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). There is actually a limitation of this "Twenty-Five 
Percent Rule" for the smaller sentencing ranges: "If a sentence specified by the 
guidelines includes a tenn of imprisonment, the n1axilnum of the range 
established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more 
than the greater of25 percent or 6 months ... ," Id. (emphasis added). Note 
that the Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States is of the opinion that the Twenty-Five Percent Rule is not as confining as 
the Commission believes. See Catherine M. Goodwin, Background of the AO 
Memorandum Opinion on the 25% Rule, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 109 (1995); 
Memorandum Opinion of the General Counsel's Office, Administrative Office of 
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United States Courts, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 110 (1995). 
"See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) ("!fa sentence specified by the guidelines includes 
a tenn of imprisoounent, the maximum of the range established for such a term 
shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 
percent or 6 tnonths, except that, if the 111i11i1nu111 ternz of the range is 30 years or 
more, the maximum may be life i111priso11111e11t.") (emphasis added). 
"TI1ese included the decision to allow the coverage of adjacent guideline ranges 
to overlap, so that the high point of a given guideline range is the midpoint of 
the next range and the low point of the next after that. For example, in Criminal 
History Category l, an Offense Level of 16 produces a range of 21 to 27 
months. Offense Level 18, two levels higher, has a range of27 to 33 months. 
See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). This overlap does increase the 
number of cells in the table, but in doing so it allows the court to defuse debates 
about one- or hvo-Jevel sentencing factors by pointing out that it can itnpose the 
satne sentence regardless of \Vhether the factor is applied. 
94See Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 706. 
"See U.S.S.G. § 5B3.l(a), (b)(l). 
"See id. § 5B3. l(b)(2)(E). 
"See id.§ 5B3.l(b)(4)(A), (b)(7)(C). 
"See id.§ 3El.l(a), (b). 
99 Assuming that Jack served more than sixty days but less than a year for each 
of his three prior offenses, and that he was released from the most recent 
sentence more than l\vo years ago, he \vould have six Critninal History points. 
See id.§ 4Al.I. This would put him in Criminal History Category Ill. See id. 
ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table}. 
100/d. (sentencing table). 
"'See Bowman, supra note 8, at 747 ("The Guidelines can and should be made 
simpler, both in terms of use by legal professionals and their comprehensibility 
to nonprofessionals affected by the results they generate."). 
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'"The general federal bank robbery statute has a statutory maximum of twenty 
years. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1998). Another five years would be added for 
carrying the gun, if the prosecution charged and convicted the defendant 
accordingly. See id.§ 924(c). 
103Bo\vman, supra note 8, at 706. 
104As Professor Bo\vman says, "The workings of the guidelines are complicated, 
but at least they are visible." Id. at 707-08; see also id. at 720 (describing 
openness of guidelines system as one of its strengths). 
'°'"No person shall be ... deprived of ... liberty ... without due process of law 
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
'°'The most recent figure was 48,848, from fiscal year 1997. U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, supra note 63, at vii (1998). 
107111e data is available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research at the University of Michigan. For details, visit the Intemet 
web site for the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data at 
<http://www.ICPSR.umich.edu/NACJDfl1ome.htrnl>. 
wssee Dalzef11 supra note 13, at 327~30. 
'°'U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1989 11 (1989). 
''°Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
"'See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 
SURVEY (1997). 
"'Id. at 19. The highest score, 3.6, was shared by drug possession and drug 
manufachlfe, import/export, and trafficking. The lowest score, 2.7, was shared 
by robbery and fraud. 
msee Dalzell, supra note 13, at 333. 
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